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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON EXCHANGE RATE ECONOMICS  
 
A country’s economy is becoming more and more dynamic and complicated in its scale and 
mobility. So, the concerns of exchange rate economics have become more popular. My research 
interest is in international economics with its major factor, exchange rates and other 
macroeconomic variables. Chapter 1 presents a brief introduction of the three studies.  
Chapter Two investigate the role of exchange rate changes with particular attention to 
international capital flows. With liberalization of capital movements, international capital 
movements became free and unrestricted in many emerging market economies as well as 
developed countries. Using a Vector Auto-regressive (VAR) model for a small open economy in 
which the endogeneity of exchange rate changes is fully taken into account, I find that capital 
movements are more likely to be a cause of output fluctuations and current account deficits in 
developing countries than a channel of equilibrium changes. I also find that domestic currency 
depreciation is far more likely to be contractionary on domestic output in developing countries 
than in developed countries. Interestingly, the trade balance improves after depreciation 
regardless of its output consequence. These findings suggest that there are important differences 
between developed and developing economies in the way capital movements and exchange rate 
changes affect and are affected. 
Chapter Three demonstrates the dynamic relationship between the current account and the 
real exchange rate in response to permanent and temporary shocks using structural VAR models 
for seven developed countries and five developing countries. Special focus is given to the issue of 
the stationarity of the current account. Capital flows are also included to capture external shocks 
as well as potential structural breaks due to financial liberalization. I find that the results for unit 
root tests for the current account are ambiguous. By testing two different VAR models, each 
taking an opposing stance on the stationarity of the current account, I conclude that responses 
based on a stationary current account are a better fit to the current theoretical view than those 
based on a nonstationary current account process. Additionally, the real exchange rate and the 
current account are positively correlated under a permanent shock while two variables are 
negatively correlated under a monetary shock. I also find that real exchange rate is an endogenous 
variable, which is not closely related to the temporary factors that affect the current account in the 
short run.  
Chapter Four examines the long-run mean reverting behavior of the real exchange rates with 
its six different definitions for 27 economies using annual data from 1974 to 2003. I find that 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) holds better, and the half-life of the real exchange rates is shorter 
when the wholesale price index, rather than consumer price index, is used as price level measure. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there is no evidence that PPP holds better with trade-weighted real 
exchange rates than with bilateral ones regardless of the price index used. Strong evidence for 
 PPP emerges only with the use of Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) panel tests but not with the 
Levine, Lin, and Chu (2002).  
 
KEY WORDS: Exchange Rates, Vector Autoregression, Current Account, Purchasing Power 
Parity, Half-life 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation contains three independent essays within exchange rate economics. In this 
dissertation, I wanted to examine the effect of devaluation on the economy, the dynamic response 
of the current account and exchange rate under structural shocks, and the long-run behavior of the 
exchange rate. The effect of devaluation has been an issue for developing countries as it may 
have contractionary effect on the output. Among many reasons, the balance-sheet effect has 
received attention as an additional channel of contractionary devaluation, especially in developing 
countries. Due to the inability to borrow in their own currency, business firms in developing 
countries are likely to have a currency mismatch in their balance sheets – liabilities denominated 
in hard currencies (mainly in the US dollar), while assets and earnings primarily in the domestic 
currency. In such a situation, a depreciation of the domestic currency increases the domestic 
currency value of the debt. The increased debt service burden reduces the profits and thus brings 
in the recessionary effect to the economy. Many researchers emphasize the significance of the 
balance sheet effects in the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Krugman 1999; Corsetti et al., 1999). 
Frankel (2005) argues that the balance sheet effect was a major contractionary channel of the 
currency crises in developing countries in the 1990s.  
International capital movement has received attention as one of the most important factors of 
output and exchange rate determination (Calvo et al., 1996; Kamin and Rogers, 2000; Kim, 2000; 
Kim and Ying, 2001). While international capital flows bring a number of benefits to the 
receiving country, they may also cause important problems as well. Among other things, the 
country becomes vulnerable and risks a freeze of capital inflows and an eventual financial crisis. 
As Reinhart (2000) maintains, devaluation in developing countries can lead to a loss of access to 
international capital markets and, thus, generate contractionary effects on output. The role of the 
capital accounts in the developed countries also cannot be ignored. After financial crisis in Asian 
countries, massive capitals came to the U.S. to find safe and riskless assets. This large demand for 
riskless assets by foreigners induces bubbles in the financial markets and eventually a financial 
crisis in the U.S. (Caballero et al., 2008; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009).  
In Chapter 2, I investigate the role of changes in the exchange rate while paying particular 
attention to international capital flows. Using a vector auto-regression (VAR) model for a small 
open economy, in which the endogeneity of exchange rate changes is fully taken into account, I 
find that capital movements are more likely to be a cause of output fluctuations and current 
account deficits in developing countries than a channel of equilibrium changes. I also find that 
domestic currency depreciation is far more likely to be contractionary on domestic output in 
2 
 
developing countries than in developed countries. Interestingly, the current account balance 
improves after depreciation regardless of its output consequences. These findings suggest that 
there are important differences between developed and developing economies in the way capital 
movements and exchange rate changes affect and are affected by other economic factors. 
In Chapter 3, I investigate the effect of the exchange rate on output by taking into account the 
dynamic relationship between the current account and the exchange rate. The stationarity of the 
current account has been an issue for a long time. Many researchers, such as Shibata and Shintani 
(1998), Husted (1992), Ghosh and Ostry (1995), Wu et al. (1996), Bergin and Sheffrin (2000), 
Nason and Rogers (2002), Baharumshah et al. (2003), and Spagnolo and Sola (2004) could not 
support the stationary current account process with their empirical results. Given the uncertainty 
regarding the stationarity of the current account, I consider both the case where it is assumed to 
be stationary and the case where it is nonstationary. I also go beyond the existing studies by 
including capital flows. Previous studies indicate that capital inflows have played an important 
role in the determination of the current account and the real exchange rate especially in emerging 
market economies that recently had financial liberalization.   
I find that the results for unit root tests for the current account are ambiguous. By testing two 
different VAR models, each taking an opposing stance on the stationarity of the current account, I 
conclude that the responses based on the assumption of a stationary current account are a better fit 
to the current theoretical view than those based on a nonstationary current account process. A 
permanent shock induces a positive correlation – that is, increasing the current account while 
appreciating the real exchange rate. On the other hand, under a temporary shock, the correlation 
of the two variables is negative – that is, an increase in the current account is associated with a 
real depreciation.  
In Chapter 4, I re-examine the PPP hypothesis with various definitions of the real exchange 
rate for the post-Bretton Woods period of floating exchange rates. I compare the conventional 
univariate tests and the panel tests. In panel tests, we employ both the test of Levine, Lin, and 
Chu (LLC, 2002) and the more recent test by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS, 2003).  
Some of important findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows: 1) PPP holds better 
and the half-life of the real exchange rate is shorter when the WPI rather than the CPI is used as 
the price index; 2) There is no evidence that PPP holds better with trade-weighted real exchange 
rates than with bilateral ones regardless of the price index used; 3) Strong evidence for PPP 
emerges only with the use of IPS panel tests; 4) I find the median of half-live estimates to be less 
than 3 years, which shorter than the current consensus.   
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Chapter Two 
Exchange Rate Changes and Output: Developed vs. Developing Economies 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The effects of currency devaluation have been studied in a voluminous literature. According 
to a typical textbook description, devaluation or depreciation of the domestic currency boosts 
exports while discouraging imports, and thereby stimulates aggregate demand and output growth 
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 2005).1 Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) show that devaluation under the 
gold standard in the 1930s led to an increase in economic growth in countries such as the United 
Kingdom, Finland, Denmark, and Norway. Empirical studies such as Goldstein and Khan (1985) 
and Gylfason and Schmid (1983) provide evidence of the expansionary effects of devaluation in 
the short- and medium-run in a number of countries – both less developed as well as 
industrialized. Dornbusch and Werner (1994) also suggest that policies that keep the real 
exchange rate competitive encourage output growth as well as prevent balance of payment crises. 
In a recent empirical study, Shi (2006) finds that the appreciation of the renminbi causes the 
contractionary effect on output in China.  
A rich literature including Hirschman (1949), Diaz-Alejandro (1963), and Krugman and 
Taylor (1978) have discussed numerous possible channels of the contractionary effects of 
devaluation, especially in the context of developing countries. The contractionary effects of 
devaluation may work through the demand side – such as a reduction of the trade balance or a 
redistribution of income leading to a decrease in domestic spending. The trade balance declines if 
the sum of the price elasticities of the import and export demand is less than one or if the trade 
balance is initially in a large deficit. Devaluation also causes a redistribution of income from 
wage earners who have a low saving propensity to profit earners who have a high saving 
propensity, thereby reducing aggregate demand for domestic output. If there are ad valorem taxes 
on traded goods, devaluation also redistributes income in the short-run from the private sector, 
which has a relatively low propensity to save, to the government sector, which has a higher 
propensity to save (almost unit saving propensity). These channels lead to a reduction in 
aggregate demand.2 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we use the terms “devaluation” and “depreciation” interchangeably for convenience. In fact, 
devaluation refers to a discrete exchange rate change under a fixed exchange rate. It is more likely to be 
infrequent and large in magnitude. Whether the effects of exchange rate changes are equivalent regardless 
of the exchange rate regime in which they occur is a subject of contentious debate. See Ahmed et al.,(2002) 
for more about the debate. 
2See  Diaz-Alegjando (1963) and Krugman and Taylor (1978). 
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In monetarist models, the contractionary effect of devaluation arises as it increases the 
domestic price level through higher imported goods prices and, given the stickiness of nominal 
money wage and money supply, reduces the real money balance and real income. On the supply 
side, the contractionary effect can be due to a higher price of imported goods and an overall 
increase in the cost of production (Findlay and Rodriguez, 1977; Marston, 1982). 
In recent experiences, the balance sheet effect has received attention as an additional channel 
of contractionary devaluation, especially in developing countries. Due to the inability to borrow 
in their own currency, business firms in developing countries are likely to have a mismatch 
currency in their balance sheets – liabilities denominated by hard currencies (mainly in the US 
dollar), while assets and earnings primarily in the domestic currency. In such a situation, a 
depreciation of the domestic currency increases the domestic currency value of the debt. The 
increased debt service burden reduces the profits and thus brings in the recessionary effect to the 
economy. Many researchers emphasize the significance of the balance sheet effects in the 1997 
Asian financial crisis (Krugman 1999; Corsetti et al., 1999). Frankel (2005) argues that the 
balance sheet effect was a major contractionary channel of the currency crises in developing 
countries in the 1990s.  
Several papers compare the effects of devaluation in developed and developing economies. 
Kamin and Klau (1998) find that for 27 developed and developing countries – when the sources 
of spurious correlation and reversal causality are controlled for – contractionary effects are 
significant only in the short-run but not in the long-run. And they find no evidence that this effect 
is any stronger in developing countries than in industrialized countries. Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Miteza (2003) conclude that the results of devaluation depend on country-specific characteristics, 
the model, and estimation techniques. For instance, papers which mainly focus on the channel of 
demand for developed countries are more likely to find that devaluations are expansionary while 
the studies of the supply-side channels for developing countries are more likely to arrive at the 
opposite conclusion. Kim and Ying (2007) find that there is no evidence on the contractionary 
effects for East Asian countries after controlling for structural breaks and conclude that the results 
may depend on the definition of the exchange rate and the period of estimation.3 Ahmed et al., 
(2002) also find the contractionary effects of devaluation on output in developing countries are 
due to economic fundamentals and a failure of the pegged exchange rate regime.  
Positive correlation between the real exchange rate and real income should not necessarily be 
treated as evidence of contractionary effects of devaluation. It may be a spurious correlation due 
                                                 
3 For instance, the authors show that devaluations were never contractionary in East Asia before the 1997 
financial crisis and if the exchange rate is measured as the bilateral rate against the US dollar.  
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to the influence of third factors. For instance, devaluations frequently have occurred in response 
to adverse shocks, such as deterioration in terms of trade or an adverse shock to the capital 
account. These problems tend to depress economic activity even in the absence of devaluation. 
Studies that control for third factors also find that output declines in the aftermath of devaluation. 
Edwards (1986) analyzes the contractionary effect of devaluation on output in developing 
countries during 1965-1980.  The results of an empirical model incorporating monetary and fiscal 
policy and terms of trade show that devaluation generates a contractionary effect in the short-run 
but is neutral in the long-run.4 Holding constant the terms of trade, import growth, the money 
supply, and the fiscal balance, Morley (1992) finds that devaluation causes contractionary effects 
in the short-run (in two years) due to a sharp decrease in investment. Using several vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models, Kamin and Rogers (2000) also control for third factors, such as 
capital account, and find that devaluation leads to an output contraction in Mexico. 
Recently, international capital movement has received attention as one of the most important 
factors of output and exchange rate determination (Calvo et al., 1996; Kamin and Rogers, 2000; 
Kim, 2000; Kim and Ying, 2001). An inflow of international capital causes an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate and increases in current account deficits. Consequently, the country becomes 
vulnerable and risks a freeze of capital inflows and, an eventual financial crisis. As Reinhart 
(2000) maintains, devaluation in developing countries can lead to a loss of access to international 
capital markets and, thus, generate contractionary effects on output.  
In this paper, we investigate the effects of currency devaluation in nine relatively small open 
economies: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Mexico, Korea, and 
Malaysia. We employ a VAR model, similar to the one used by Kim and Roubini (2000) and Kim 
and Ying (2007), to account for the endogeneity of the exchange rate. The above discussion 
establishes the importance of controlling for third factors, such as external shocks, to have a 
correct understanding of the connection between the exchange rate and economic activity. More 
importantly, we take into account the important role of capital flows as a cause and effect of 
exchange rate changes.   
The empirical results of this paper can be summarized as follows. We find that in Mexico and 
Malaysia devaluation leads to a significant decline in output even if the effects of third variables 
such as capital flows are taken into account. However, there is no evidence of contractionary 
effects of devaluation in developed countries. We also find that output in developing countries is 
                                                 
4 However, the author points out that using annual data for empirical tests, one may not capture the 
dynamics of exchange rate behavior accurately. Also, the author could not verify the channel of 
contractionary effect in the short-run. 
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more vulnerable to external shocks such as capital flows and exchange rate changes. This seems 
to indicate that the nature of capital flows and other external shocks is fundamentally different in 
industrial countries than in emerging market economies, as suggested by Lane (2003). 5 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes preliminary data analysis, and 
Section 3 discusses the econometric method and the assumptions employed for identification. 
Section 4 provides the empirical results; and the conclusion and implications for policymakers are 
summarized in Section 5.  
 
2.2 Preliminary Data Analysis 
The data are obtained from nine countries. Among developing countries in Latin American 
and Asian countries, we select Mexico, Korea, and Malaysia. For comparison, six developed 
countries, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands are chosen. The 
choice of countries is dictated by the availability of relevant data. We use quarterly data collected 
from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). The 
sample periods are as follows: Australia (1976:Q2-2004:Q4), Canada (1971:Q2-2004:Q4), 
Switzerland (1976:Q2-2004:Q2), Spain (1976:Q2-2004:Q2), Italy (1971:Q2-2004:Q2), the 
Netherlands (1971:Q2-2004:Q2), Korea (1976:Q1-2004:Q4), Malaysia (1981:Q1-2004:Q4), and 
Mexico (1981:Q1-2004:Q4). 6 The sample period includes both fixed exchange rates and floating 
exchange rate regimes for several countries. The periods of fixed exchange rate regimes and 
currency crises or large exchange rate changes are in Tables 2.1a and 2.1b.7  
Tables 2.1a and 2.1b here 
Variables are defined as follows: capital flow and current account are measured as ratio to 
GDP and coded as KAR and CAR.8 The financial account and the current account data in the IFS 
are used for all countries except Malaysia. Due to the lack of necessary data, the current account 
balance for Malaysia is calculated by subtracting imports from exports using DOTS data. Real 
output (IP) is measured by the index of seasonal adjusted industrial production from the IFS. The 
                                                 
5  Lane (2003) argues that emerging market economies, in comparison to developed countries, have 
different economic infrastructure which makes them more volatile and causes greater cyclical fluctuations 
after currency devaluation. He shows that the presence of substantial foreign-currency debt, along with 
credit market frictions, is one of the major characteristics of emerging countries which increase the 
volatility of output and leave them more exposed to business cycles. 
6 Kim and Ying (2007) and others found a major structural break in the 1997 financial crisis in most East 
Asian countries. However, in this paper, we consider the sample period as a whole since our focus is to see 
whether there is any difference in the effects of exchange rate devaluation comparing two different country 
groups.  
7 Ahmed et al. (2002). 
8 We use the fitted value of GDP obtained from a regression of the nominal GDP (seasonally adjusted) to a 
linear trend. 
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relative price ratio (RCP) is calculated by dividing the domestic price level (CPI) by the foreign 
price level, which is calculated as the trade-weighted average of the price levels for four major 
trading partners. The price level is represented by the consumer price index in all countries but 
Germany, where the GDP deflator is used instead. The real money balance (MR) is calculated by 
dividing the money supply by the domestic price level. As for the money supply, we used M1 for 
Australia, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain; and we use money in the national definition 
for Switzerland, Korea, Mexico, and Malaysia. The nominal exchange rate (NX) is the weighted 
average of the bilateral exchange rates against the US dollar from IFS using the same weighting 
scheme as for the foreign price level.9  The foreign price level and foreign output are similarly 
defined as the trade-weighted average of corresponding figures. The real exchange rate (RX) is 
obtained by dividing NX by RCP. The U.S. three-month Treasury bill interest rate is used as the 
foreign interest rate for all countries except Switzerland which uses the German government bond 
yield instead. All variables are in logarithm except for the interest rates and the capital and 
current account ratios.  
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 here 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report the results of the unit root and cointegration tests. The augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) with four lags is used for these tests. The results indicate that the 
presence of unit roots is not rejected at the five percent significance level for most variables in 
most countries. This implies that most variables in the model are likely to be nonstationary. Table 
2.3 shows the result of the cointegration tests labeled CI1, CI2, and CI3. We first consider CI1, 
which is the test of cointegration for real output and the real exchange rate. We then consider CI2 
and CI3, which expand the cointegration relationship by adding foreign income in CI2, and then 
adding foreign income, the capital account-output ratio, and real money supply in CI3. The 
results indicate that there is little evidence of cointegration between variables except for particular 
cases, such as the CI3 test for Canada and CI2 test for Korea. Based on these results, we precede 
with the assumption that variables are nonstationary and noncointegrated. We thus transform all 
variables into the first-differenced form in the VAR model.10  
 
                                                 
9 The weighting schemes are as follows: for Australia, (US, Japan, UK) = (0.33, 0.33, 0.33), for Spain, 
(Germany, France, Italy) = (0.4, 0.4, 0.2), for Italy, (Germany, France) = (0.6, 0.4), for the Netherlands, 
(Germany, Belgium, UK, France) = (0.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2), for Korea, (US, Japan) = (0.5, 0.5) and for Malaysia, 
(US, Japan) = (0.6, 0.4). For Canada and Mexico, the US is considered as the foreign country while, for 
Switzerland, Germany takes the role due to the preeminent role of each country for each group. 
10 With first differencing, the presence of a unit root is rejected for all variables. Complete results are 
available upon request.  
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2.3 The Econometric Method and Model’s Identification  
To investigate the response of output under devaluation, we estimate a VAR model for each 
country that includes the capital account-output ratio (KAR), industrial production (IP), relative 
price ratio (RCP), money supply (MR), the current account-output ratio (CAR), and the nominal 
exchange rate (NX). The model also includes two measures of external shocks: foreign interest 
rates, and trading-partner real income to control for exogenous shocks.11 Using a VAR with the 
Cholesky decomposition, we eliminate the effects of third factors which may generate spurious 
correlation between output and the real exchange rate, and contribute to a reverse causality 
problem. Given the evidence reported in the previous section, all variables are first differenced. 
The six endogenous variables are ordered as listed in the following equation which summarizes 
the model in reduced form:  
( )
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where )(LAij  and )(LBij  are 6x6 and 6x2 matrices of polynomials in lag operator L. We capture 
external shocks by including foreign income and the foreign interest rate. Since we employ 
quarterly data, we assume that the domestic variables can be affected by the external shocks 
within the same time period.  
The ordering of the endogenous variables can be justified as follows. First, capital flows are 
treated as the driving force of the macroeconomic variables. Empirical evidence indicates that 
capital flows are one of the important determinants of output and the exchange rate; and capital 
flows are strongly influenced by external shocks such as the world interest rate and U.S. business 
cycle.12 By positioning the capital account at the top of the variables, we assume that it is the 
most exogenous variable among the endogenous variables. In other words, innovations on the 
capital account have contemporaneous effects on the other endogenous variables in the system, 
but innovations from the other variables have no contemporaneous effects on the capital account.  
Second, real money supply is included since the behavior of real money can be an important 
key to understanding the effects of devaluation. The identification assumption is that output does 
                                                 
11 This means that we decompose the real exchange rate into the nominal exchange rate and the price level. 
12 See Calvo, et al., (1996), Kamin and Rogers (2000), and Kim (2000). 
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not contemporaneously react to money supply changes. Based on this assumption, output is 
ordered ahead of real money in the model. Third, the real exchange rate is separated into the 
nominal exchange rate and the relative price. With this separation, we can examine the hypothesis 
whether the behavior of the real exchange rate is invariant with respect to the exchange rate 
regime. The hypothesis implies, for instance, that a depreciation of the real exchange rate can be 
obtained by a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate or a decline in the domestic price level.  
Fourth, in this model, the nominal exchange rate is treated as the most endogenous variable 
and is, thus, placed at the bottom. This means that contemporaneous changes in the exchange rate 
due to other variables are removed from innovations on the nominal exchange rate. As a result, 
we can examine the pure effects of exchange rate changes. This methodology is adapted by Kim 
and Roubini (2000) and also Kim and Ying (2007).13   
 
2.4 Empirical Results    
2.4.1 Granger Causality between Current Accounts and Capital Flows 
Before presenting formal results of the VAR analysis, we first perform the Granger causality 
tests between the current account balance and capital flows. The two hypotheses are: (1) current 
account deficits cause capital inflow; and (2) capital inflows cause current account deficits. Table 
2.3 shows the results of Granger causality tests for the bilateral relationship between KAR and 
CAR with four lags. The main pattern is that current account deficits cause capital inflows in the 
group of developed countries while, in developing countries, capital flows cause current account 
deficits, with an exception of Malaysia. 
Table 2.4 here 
The results suggest that capital flows tend to be accommodating or financing current account 
deficits in developed countries. On the other hand, in Korea and Mexico, capital flows seem to 
behave as an autonomous source of disturbance leading ultimately to current account deficits, but 
not in Malaysia. The following results also corroborate the differences between Malaysia and the 
other two developing countries. 
 
2.4.2 Impulse Responses  
The panels presented in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 present the key results of our analysis: the 
responses to a one-period, one-standard deviation shock in the nominal exchange rate and the 
capital account. Recall that the VAR model is estimated using the first differenced data series. 
                                                 
13 Kim and Ying (2000) also show that a change in the U.S. real GDP and the interest rates explain more 
than 50% of capital inflows to in Korea and Mexico.  
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For ease of interpretation, the impulse responses are converted back to their initial levels. In each 
graph, the point estimates of the impulse responses are bounded by one-standard-deviation bands, 
roughly corresponding to 84 percent confidence intervals.14  
Figure 2.1 here 
The panels presented in Figure 2.1 show the responses of the endogenous variables to 
devaluation (or depreciation) of the domestic currency. In a standard textbook model, the shock 
would lead to a rise in the current account, output, and the domestic price level. In our results, the 
devaluation in domestic currency generates different responses in output. Among the developed 
economies, output increases in all cases except the Netherlands, although, all responses are 
statistically insignificant except in Italy, which shows significant positive short-term responses 
for about five quarters. For developing countries, however, output declines significantly and 
persistently in Mexico and Malaysia, while it increases insignificantly in Korea. This 
contractionary effect of currency devaluation in developing countries is consistent with Kamin 
and Rogers (2000), who test the effect of devaluation by controlling for third factors, such as 
capital account and spurious correlation, and find devaluation indeed causes the contractionary 
effect observed in Mexico.  
The responses of the relative price also exhibit different patterns in the two groups of 
countries. The relative price ratio – domestic to foreign – increases significantly in all three 
developing countries while showing little or no responses in developed economies with the 
exception of the Netherlands. The empirical evidence of exchange rate pass-through supports that 
there are declines in the rate of pass-through in developed countries, and the pass-through rates 
are relatively greater in the emerging market economies. See Bailliu and Bouakez, (2004), 
Gagnon and Ihrig (2004), Campa and Goldgerg (2005), Frankel (2005), and Razmi (2005) for 
more details. In countries where the relative price rises significantly − i.e. Mexico, Malaysia, and 
the Netherlands − we also find that real money declines significantly. In other countries, real 
money supply shows no discernable movements.  
 The current account improves in all countries but Canada. It is interesting to note that the 
current account improves significantly even in Mexico and Malaysia where output declines in 
response to devaluation. Thus, the standard textbook model may be vindicated in assuming the 
positive response of the current account. However, this suggests that whether currency 
                                                 
14 Standard errors for the impulse responses and forecast error variance decompositions were computed 
using Monte Carlo simulations with 1000 iterations.  
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devaluation will be expansionary or contractionary on domestic output does not depend on the 
response of the current account. The reason must be elsewhere.15  
Figure 2.2 here 
The panels presented in Figure 2.2 show the impulse responses to a capital inflow, or a 
positive innovation, in the capital account. They show that output rises significantly in developing 
countries, with the exception of Malaysia. In Korea and Mexico, real money supply expands 
while the domestic currency appreciates, and the current account declines. Reflecting the mixed 
effects of output and monetary expansion in the presence of currency appreciation, the relative 
price does not show any significant changes. This strong increase in real money balance indicates 
central banks’ intervention to resist currency appreciation. These responses in Korea and Mexico 
are consistent with a textbook description of the effects of capital inflows in developing 
countries16. On the other hand, capital flows in Malaysia do not generate significant responses in 
output or the exchange rate. Only real money supply increases the current account declines 
significantly only in the first few quarters. These findings suggest that perhaps capital controls 
installed in Malaysia during the financial crisis in 1997-1998, and central bank intervention in the 
foreign exchange market, have limited the effects of capital flows within the economy. 
In contrast to strong and statistically significant responses in developing countries, capital 
movements seem to have largely insignificant effects in developed economies. Output level 
remains largely unaffected in all countries but Switzerland. Similarly, real money balance 
increases significantly only in Switzerland. The exchange rate responses are never significant in 
developed countries. The relative price tends to rise and the current account tends to decline. 
However, responses are significant in Italy and Canada only, respectively. On balance, there is 
little evidence that capital inflows lead to a boom accompanied by a currency appreciation in 
developed economies.  
 
 2.4.3 Forecast Error Decomposition 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present variance decompositions of output and the nominal exchange rate. 
They show the fraction of the forecast error variance for each variable that is attributable to 
innovations in each endogenous variable. The error term itε denotes innovations from the 
equation for variable i. We present the decomposition for forecast horizons at four and twenty 
                                                 
15  Diaz-Alejandro (1965) also shows that devaluation reduces real domestic output significantly even 
though the trade balance improves. 
16 See, inter alia, Calvo et al., (1996) and Lane (2003). 
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quarters. The four- (twenty-) quarter horizon may be considered as short- (medium-) run 
relationships.  
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 here 
The results of the variance decomposition in Table 2.5 can be summarized as follows. First, 
the predominant source of variation in output is the own shock ( IPtε ) in all countries. The 
contribution of own shock is greater in developed economies than in developing countries, and it 
becomes smaller over extended time periods, from around 90 to 57 percent for developed 
countries and from 76 to 42 percent for developing countries.17  
In developed countries, innovations in real money balance are the second most important 
factor for variations in output. All other factors appear to be minor or insignificant with a few 
exceptions. On the other hand, in the developing countries, external sectors show up as a 
prominent cause of output fluctuations. Capital flows in Korea and exchange rate shocks in 
Mexico and Malaysia are the second most important sources of output fluctuations.18 In the 
medium run, shocks to the current account, such as changes in terms of trade become almost as 
important the two external structural shocks. 
Table 2.6 shows that own shocks are also the most important explanatory factor in the 
variation of the exchange rate in all countries except Korea. No other particular macroeconomic 
variables in the model contribute to the fluctuation of the exchange rate in developed countries. 
However, shocks to capital account are a significant factor in explaining the behavior of the 
exchange rate for developing countries, with the exception of Malaysia. The role of capital flows 
is exceptionally large in Korea, establishing itself as most important cause of exchange rate 
fluctuations both in the short and medium run.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the interaction between output and the exchange rate, in 
particular, whether currency devaluation is likely to be contractionary in developed countries as 
well as in Latin and Asian developing countries, as reported in many previous studies with 
surprising consistency. In econometric analysis, dealing with currency crashes poses problems 
since – in most cases, there are a number of third factors that move together. Among other things, 
                                                 
17 The evidence of more volatile output fluctuation in developing countries is also shown in Lane (2003). 
By controlling other factors, Lane finds that there is an inverse relationship between output per capita and 
volatility.  
18 Shocks to capital flows play a relatively smaller role for the fluctuation of output in Malaysia than other 
developing countries. Malaysia is well known to have used capital controls in the 1997 financial crisis, 
which has presumably helped to maintain stability in the middle of financial turmoil. As a consequence, 
variations in capital flows have much smaller effects on the exchange rate and output. 
13 
 
data for developing countries are heavily contaminated by the episodes of currency crashes that 
are induced by the reversal of capital inflows.19 It is important to see the effects of exchange rate 
changes that can be considered relatively free from the effects of third factors and endogeneity 
issues. That is the purpose of the VAR modeling for this paper.  
What we find is that even if we remove the effects of third variables, such as capital flows 
and money supply changes, we still see strong evidence of contractionary devaluation in 
developing countries like Mexico and Malaysia (but not in Korea). However, there is no evidence 
of contractionary effect of devaluation in developed countries.  
We also find that developing-country output is more vulnerable to external shocks such as 
capital flows, exchange rate changes, and variations in the current account. This seems to suggest 
that the nature of capital flows and other external shocks is fundamentally different in industrial 
countries than in emerging market economies (Lane, 2003). For instance, in developed economies, 
capital flows are more likely to be financing current account imbalances instead of a source of 
disturbance in the economy. In Korea and Mexico, the opposite seems to be the case. 
With financial liberalization, devaluation in a typical emerging market economy may now be 
more likely to be contractionary as it worsens the balance sheet of domestic firms with heavy 
foreign-currency liabilities.20 Moreover, currency devaluation may result in serious interruption 
of external financing through a loss of credibility with international financial investors. Thus, as 
Mussa (2000) points out, high openness to international capital flows, especially with large 
portion of short-term debt, can be dangerous. Malaysia is the exception in this regard. We suspect 
that the results are perhaps due to capital controls on capital outflows installed by the Malaysian 
government during the 1998 financial crisis. With the restrictions on free capital account 
transactions installed during the 1997-1998 financial crises, Malaysia’s exchange controls seem 
to have minimized the effects of capital flows and the contractionary influence of devaluation that 
arises with the reversal of capital flows.21  
The policy implications of the findings of this paper are significant. The likelihood that 
devaluation can be contractionary poses difficult problems for policy makers. One cannot simply 
revalue the domestic currency to boost the domestic economy because devaluation would be 
                                                 
19 For instance, Ahmed et al., (2002) find that contractionary effects of devaluation in emerging countries 
are a result of abandonment of pegged exchange rate regimes and the unique structure of developing 
economics. 
20 See Bebczuk et al (2007) for more recent evidence. 
21 The Malaysia’s capital controls mandated foreigners to wait a year before converting ringgit from the 
sales of Malaysian securities into hard currencies. Additionally, Malaysians also were forbidden from 
investing abroad without prior approval from the central bank, Bank Negara. By restricting on capital 
outflows as well as short term capital inflows, the government has tried to prevent economic disaster from 
capital flight (Abdelal and Alfaro, 2003).  
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contractionary. “This is the strategy that got Mexico into trouble in 1994, and given time, the 
same strategy would certainly lead to a new financial crisis in the future” (Kamin and Rogers, 
2000, p.103). If currency depreciation in the aftermath of an adverse shock to the economy causes 
further deepening of a recession, the case for flexible exchange rates in such an economy is 
diminished. The debate over the appropriate exchange rate regime in emerging market economies 
is not over yet. However, focusing on the role of the exchange rate regime per se seems to be 
futile. No exchange rate regime would be a good substitute for a stable macroeconomic 
environment supported by high trade openness and a well-managed financial system.  
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Figure 2.1  The Impulse Responses to the Nominal Exchange Rate 
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Figure 2.2  The Impulse Responses to a Capital Inflow Shock  
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0.00064
0.00080
0.00096
 
Netherlands 
0 5 10 15
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.00014
-0.00007
0.00000
0.00007
0.00014
0.00021
0.00028
0.00035
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
 
Korea 
0 5 10 15
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.100
-0.075
-0.050
-0.025
-0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
 
Mexico 
0 5 10 15
-2.1
-1.4
-0.7
0.0
0.7
1.4
2.1
2.8
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.16
-0.08
0.00
0.08
0.16
0.24
0.32
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
-0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.0050
-0.0025
0.0000
0.0025
0.0050
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.12
-0.06
0.00
0.06
0.12
0.18
0.24
0.30
0.36
 
Malaysia 
0 5 10 15
-0.054
-0.036
-0.018
0.000
0.018
0.036
0.054
0.072
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.100
-0.075
-0.050
-0.025
-0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
 
 
0 5 10 15
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
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Table 2.1a Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes in the Sample  
 
Country Period Regime 
Spain January 1989 – present  Pegged to the ECU 
Italy February 1973 – September 1992  
November 1996 – present  
Pegged to the ECU 
Netherlands 1979 –  present  Pegged to the ECU 
Korea May 1964 – February 1980   Pegged to the US dollar 
Malaysia September 1975 – September 1997 and 
September 1998 – present  
Pegged to the US dollar 
Mexico March 1977 – December 1994  Pegged to the US dollar 
 
 
Table 2.1b Currency Crisis or Large Exchange Rate Changes 
 
Country Period 
Spain September 1992  
Italy September 1992  
Netherlands September 1992  
Korea January 1980, November 1997  
Malaysia September 1998 
Mexico December 1994  
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Table 2.2 Unit Roots Tests  
 
 Variables 
 KAR IP RCP MR CAR NX RX 
Australia -2.4 -0.44 -0.44 -0.97 -3.16** -1.45 -0.39 
Canada -2.14 0.10 -2.27 1.37 -2.54 -1.86 -1.78 
Switzerland -3.35** -0.00 -2.80 -0.47 -2.07 -2.07 -2.42 
Italy -3.02** -2.06 -2.97** -0.09 -3.59*** -3.23** -2.23 
Spain -4.05*** -2.82 -2.66 -0.58 -3.04** -1.58 -2.12 
Netherlands -2.92** -1.83 -2.06 -0.24 -1.80 -2.32 -2.91** 
Korea -2.56 -1.48 -2.29 -0.69 -2.55 -1.83 -2.07 
Mexico -2.56 0.06 -3.46** -1.30 -2.01 -2.62 -2.53 
Malaysia -2.21 -1.18 -0.58 -0.53 -2.29 -2.08 -2.49 
 
 
• Critical values: 1%= -3.479,  5%= -2.883  
• ‘**’ (‘***’) indicates significance at 5 (1) percent level. 
• Although the sample periods vary for countries, the sample sizes are close enough to use 
the same critical value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 Cointegration Test 
 
 CI1 CI2 CI3 
Countries (IP, RX) (IP, RX, *y ) (IP, RX, *y , KAR, MR) 
Australia -2.72 -3.24 -3.68  
Canada -1.65 -3.18 -4.69* 
Switzerland -1.11 -3.94  -3.53 
Italy -1.97 -3.51  -3.25 
Spain -2.49 -3.60 -3.15 
Netherlands -1.43 -3.44 -3.65 
Korea -2.11 -4.61* -3.92 
Mexico -0.99 -3.11 -2.69 
Malaysia -1.04 -3.76 -3.63 
 
 
• Critical values:  
 CI1 CI2 CI3 
 1%        5% 1%      5% 1%      5% 
Australia, Canada, 
Switzerland, Italy, Spain, 
Netherlands 
  
  -4.40     -3.81 
 
-4.78     -4.18 
 
-5.44     -4.83 
Korea    -4.42     -3.82       -4.81     -4.20     -5.48     -4.86     
Mexico, Malaysia    -4.45     -3.84         -4.84     -4.22       -5.53     -4.89      
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Table 2.4 Granger Causality Tests  
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent  
variables  
                Lagged variables 
 KAR CAR 
Australia KAR  7.19 (0.00)*** 
 CAR 1.72 (0.15)  
Canada KAR  3.72 (0.01)*** 
 CAR 1.78 (0.14)  
Switzerland KAR  1.18 (0.32) 
 CAR 0.80 (0.53)  
Italy KAR  7.18 (0.00)*** 
 CAR 0.18 (0.95)  
Spain KAR  0.86 (0.49) 
 CAR 0.48 (0.75)  
Netherlands KAR  8.74 (0.00)*** 
 CAR 1.60 (0.18)  
Korea KAR  1.83 (0.13) 
 CAR 4.56 (0.00)***  
Mexico KAR  1.88 (0.12) 
 CAR 7.20 (0.00)***  
Malaysia KAR  2.77 (0.03)** 
 CAR 0.05 (0.99)  
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 Table 2.5 Variance Decomposition of Output  
 
 
KAR
tε  IPtε RCPε MRtε CARtε  NXtε
(4) (20) (4) (20) (4) (20) (4) (20) (4) (20) (4) (20) 
             
Australia 0.44 0.28 89.38 68.49 0.42 8.34 8.41 21.05 1.32 1.58 0.03 0.26 
             
Canada 0.75 1.2 84.45 72.36 0.34 4.29 12.07 9.96 1.95 10.95 0.44 1.25 
             
Switzerland 0.75 4.68 90.51 57.64 2.00 1.68 4.36 31.63 0.92 3.42 1.46 0.95 
             
Italy 0.56 0.2 86.59 59.55 2.53 6.35 4.06 27.7 0.04 0.11 6.23 6.1 
             
Spain 2.09 2.96 85.80 81.95 1.61 2.38 3.80 5.73 3.72 3.75 2.99 3.22 
             
Netherlands 1.98 2.91 95.46 88.03 0.26 1.67 1.35 4.95 0.21 0.81 0.75 1.63 
             
Korea 16.8 9.35 72.1 72.37 0.82 4.82 9.65 8.67 0.38 1.55 0.21 3.25 
             
Mexico 13.45 9.25 53.67 42.39 0.79 1.73 3.69 1.40 9.39 20.20 19.01 25.03
             
Malaysia 3.80 5.96 76.25 43.86 0.18 0.20 3.63 4.27 3.91 20.27 12.24 25.43
             
 
 
 
Table 2.6 Variance Decomposition of the Nominal Exchange Rate 
 
 
KAR
tε  IPtε RCPε MRtε CARtε  NXtε
(4) (20) (4) (20) (4) (20) (4) (20) (4) (20) (4) (20) 
             
Australia 1.69 1.32 3.62 4.89 0.54 9.27 0.06 0.20 0.92 0.57 93.17 83.75
             
Canada 2.66 0.50 2.83 0.45 4.89 13.39 3.02 8.88 0.78 1.47 85.82 75.32
             
Switzerland 2.31 2.56 4.13 2.78 1.94 0.67 2.63 5.85 5.30 6.21 83.69 81.92
             
Italy 0.1 0.03 0.81 0.9 6.21 10.2 0.5 4.94 0.04 0.12 92.34 83.81
             
Spain 0.69 0.59 0.61 1.20 18.16 41.76 4.07 11.00 0.41 1.45 76.07 44.00
             
Netherlands 0.21 0.33 3.46 6.82 2.25 1.43 14.63 22.50 0.11 0.11 79.33 68.82
             
Korea 45.96 50.67 2.15 0.69 6.73 6.58 1.02 1.30 0.52 0.77 43.63 39.99
             
Mexico 11.19 2.11 0.08 0.20 5.28 4.86 5.40 7.91 3.62 5.55 74.43 79.39
             
Malaysia 0.58 0.22 13.06 28.40 0.97 0.30 0.94 0.25 0.53 1.67 83.91 69.17
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Chapter Three 
 The Real Exchange Rate and the Current Account  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The real exchange rate and the current account balance are two of the most important 
variables in modeling an open economy. In early models, the relationship between the two 
variables is described as more or less a unidirectional one with causation stemming from the real 
exchange rate. Conventional wisdom has been that real depreciation will lead to a decrease 
(increase) in the current account deficit (surplus). A more accurate view would be to treat both as 
endogenous and responding to other shocks.  
Intertemporal models typically consider two types of shocks: permanent and temporary. In 
most cases, permanent shocks are induced from innovations in productivity, changes in resource 
endowment, and preference while temporary shocks are due to monetary policy. Studies by 
Ghosh and Ostry (1995), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Glick and Rogoff (1995), Alquist and 
Chinn (2002), Nason and Rogers (2002), Chinn and Prasad (2003), and Bussiere et al. (2005) find 
that a permanent shock leads to a current account deficit and an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate. An increase in investment along with a decline in saving and the resulting capital inflows 
induces a current account deficit and real appreciation of the domestic currency. A temporary 
shock such as a monetary expansion by the central bank leads to a decline in the domestic interest 
rate, a capital outflow and currency deprecation. This currency depreciation improves the current 
account (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Glick and Rogoff, 1995; Giuliodori, 2004). 
 Lee and Chinn (2006) find that, in response to a temporary shock, the real exchange rate 
depreciates and the current account improves. This implies that the two variables are negatively 
correlated under a monetary shock. They also find that a permanent shock leads to a positive 
correlation - the real exchange rate appreciates while the current account improves. Blanchard et 
al. (2005) and Chinn and Lee (2009) consider changes in the preferences for the home goods as a 
permanent shock on the real exchange rate. According to Chinn and Lee (2009), a positive home 
good preference shock can bring an appreciation of the real exchange rate while the current 
account improves. An empirical study by Leonard and Stockman (2002) finds that the real 
exchange rate tends to appreciate during episodes of current account surplus, especially from the 
middle to the end of current account surplus episodes using 18 countries’ quarterly data from 
1974-1997. Devereux and Genberg (2007) report that the estimated currency appreciation 
actually improves China’s current account by over 1% of GDP.  
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In their vector autoregressive (VAR) model, Lee and Chinn (2006) proceed with the 
assumption that the current account is stationary while the real exchange rate is nonstationary. 
This assumption of the stationary current account is supported by various models. In the 
intertemporal models - which assume perfect capital mobility and consumption smoothing 
behavior - the current account behaves as a buffer to consumption shocks.22 Trehan and Walsh 
(1991) and Shibata and Shintani (1998) conclude that the current account is stationary. Ghosh 
(1995) also finds that the current account is stationary although the nonstationarity hypothesis of 
the saving-output and investment-output ratios cannot be rejected.  
Although the assumption is fairly standard in most empirical work, it is not without 
controversy. For instance, Shibata and Shintani (1998), Husted (1992), Ghosh and Ostry (1995), 
Wu et al. (1996), Bergin and Sheffrin (2000), Nason and Rogers (2002), Baharumshah et al. 
(2003), and Spagnolo and Sola (2004) could not reject the unit root hypothesis.23 Cavallari (2001) 
and Nason and Rogers (2002) find that there is a possibility that the current account has a unit 
root. They test the response of the current account under certain shocks. Cavallari (2001) presents 
empirical evidence of the role of monetary shocks on current account fluctuation for G7 countries. 
Using first differenced data on output and current account balances along with interest rate levels 
she finds that current account balances are improved in the longer horizon as a result of positive 
monetary shocks. 
Panel unit roots tests also provide mixed results. Using a panel seemingly unrelated 
regressions augmented Dickey-Fuller (SURADF) test for 21 African countries, Holmes (2003) 
finds strong evidence to support the stationarity hypothesis. Lau and Baharumshah (2005), on the 
other hand, conclude that there is a mixture of I(0) and I(1) processes in the current account of 12 
Asian countries. Wu (2000) examines the stationary of current account using the tests developed 
by Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC, 2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) and concludes that 
current account balances are stationary in ten OECD countries.  
Given the uncertainty regarding the stationarity of the current account, we consider both the 
case where it is assumed to be stationary and the case where it is nonstationary. We also go 
beyond the existing studies by including capital flows. Previous studies indicate that capital 
inflows have played an important role in the determination of the current account and the real 
exchange rate especially in emerging market economies that recently had financial liberalization. 
                                                 
22  In a typical model such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), a permanent shock does not affect the current 
account as permanent shocks cannot be smoothed away while a temporary shock leads to a (temporary) 
increase in the current account. This assumes that the response of investment is not large enough. 
23 Shibata and Shintani (1998) show that they could not reject the unit root null in a Dickey-Fuller test 
while the results from KPSS shows stationarity of the current account. They conclude that the current 
account is stationary.   
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Including capital flows appears necessary to capture external shocks as well as potential structural 
breaks due to financial liberalization, which are often ignored in conventional theoretical models.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the responses of the current account and the real 
exchange rate to permanent and temporary shocks. Since the stationarity of the current account is 
an unresolved issue, we consider both the case where it is assumed to be stationary and the case 
where it is nonstationary. We investigate unit root tests, cointegration tests, Granger causality 
tests, and conduct VAR analysis for both industrial and emerging countries over the period 1970-
2006. The VAR model with the Blanchard and Quah decomposition is adopted for this paper as 
in Lee and Chinn (2006) which classifies permanent and temporary shocks according to their 
long-run effects on the real exchange rate.24 Following the traditional approach, we assume that 
permanent shocks represent real disturbances such as changes in resource endowment, technology 
and preference. Temporary shocks, on the other hand, are of a monetary nature and do not have 
long-run effects on the real exchange rate.25  
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric 
specification for our model. Section 3 shows the data description and preliminary analysis results. 
Section 4 provides the empirical test results. Finally, the conclusions and implications for 
policymakers are summarized in Section 5.  
 
3.2 Econometric Model  
This section introduces and discusses the econometric specification of the model for the 
logarithm of real exchange rate ( tRER ) and the current account-GDP ratio ( tCAR ). The vector 
of structural shocks is denoted as tε , ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= T
t
P
t
t ε
εε  with IEE ttt =′= )(,0)( εεε  and  0)( =′stE εε  
where st ≠ .  Ptε and Ttε  are permanent and temporary shocks, respectively. They are pure noise 
and i.i.d. Note that the VAR residuals are composites of the pure innovations, Ptε  and Ttε  
(Enders, 2006). Empirical results reported in the next section show that there is convincing 
evidence that the real exchange rate contains a unit root. The real exchange rate is thus 
differenced. On the other hand, it is difficult to decide whether the current account (as ratio to 
                                                 
24 We define the structural shocks as only country specific shocks based on the results of Glick and Rogoff 
(1995). They find that global shocks have no effects on current accounts while country specific shocks do. 
25 This interpretation has been used by Lastrapes (1992), Enders and Lee (1992), Chen and Wu (1997), 
Giuliodori (2004), and Lee and Chinn (2006). However, there is a consideration that large nominal shocks 
could have permanent effects on the real exchange rate. See Chen and Wu (1997), and Giuliodori (2004) 
for more on this.  
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GDP) contains a unit root or not. Thus, we proceed to estimate two different sets of VAR models. 
In Model 1, we use the current account-GDP ratio in level form. In Model 2, the variable is 
differenced. As discussed in the previous section, we also consider adding capital flows measured 
as the capital account-GDP ratio ( tKAR ) as an exogenous variable to capture external shocks and 
potential structural breaks.  
 
Model 1:   ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡∆=⎥⎦
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t
t
t
e
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Model 2:   ⎥⎦
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We employ the maximum likelihood ratio (LR), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and 
Akaike’s Information Corrected Criterion (AICC) to determine the optimal lag length. However, 
we choose the conventional lag length of four for the VAR model for quarterly data as various leg 
lengths are suggested by different criteria. Table 3.1 shows the results of optimal lag length.  
 
Table 3.1 here 
 
3.3 Data Description and Preliminary Analysis 
3.3.1 Data 
Quarterly data are obtained for 12 countries: the U.S., Canada, the UK, Japan, Germany, 
France, Italy among developed countries and Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Mexico, and the 
Philippines among developing countries. The sample periods are different due to data availability. 
For G7 countries and Korea, we use data from 1970:Q1 to 2006:Q2. But shorter data spans are 
used for Germany (1979:Q3 to 2006:Q2), Indonesia (1991:Q1 to 2006:Q2), Mexico, Malaysia 
and the Philippines (1981:Q2 to 2006:Q2).  
The real exchange rate is defined as EP/P*, where E is the nominal exchange rate – the 
foreign currency price of a unit of domestic currency – P and P* are the domestic and foreign 
price levels. An increase in EP/P* (E) is a real (nominal) appreciation of the domestic currency. 
The nominal exchange rate is the weighted average of bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis major 
trading partners, with the weights determined by the size of total bilateral trade from 1989 to 
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1994. (Bilateral trade data are obtained from the Direction of Trade Statistics, DOT).26 The 
foreign price level is obtained in a similar manner using the same weighting schemes. 
The current account is approximated as exports less imports of goods and services, also 
obtained from International Finance Statistics (IFS). 27 The raw data is converted to its national 
currency. The current account is defined as a ratio to nominal GDP, following the usual 
tradition.28 
 
3.3.2 Preliminary Analysis 
3.3.2.1 Unit Roots Tests for RER and CAR 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the RER and the CAR for each country. There is little evidence of a 
time trend for either variable. The deep depreciation in the real exchange rates indicates the 
financial crisis in 1994 for Mexico and in 1997 for Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia. As we can 
see from the graphs, the U.S. has had a current account deficit since around 1975 while there is a 
surplus in Japan. In Germany, a huge drop of the current account balance results from unification 
around 1990.  The current account surplus has been maintained in Indonesia and Malaysia since 
the late 1990’s.    
 
                                                 
26 The each country’s weight for total trade is following. Canada: United States (0.87), Japan (0.08), United 
Kingdom (0.03), Germany (0.03), France: Germany (0.25), Italy (0.15), Belgium-Luxembourg (0.12), 
United Kingdom (0.12), United States (0.10). Spain (0.08), Netherlands (0.07), Switzerland (0.04), Japan 
(0.04), Sweden (0.02), Austria (0.01), Germany : France (0.18), Italy (0.13), Netherlands (0.13), United 
Kingdom(0.11), United States (0.10), Belgium-Luxembourg (0.10), Austria (0.08), Switzerland (0.07), 
Japan (0.06), Spain (0.04), Indonesia : Japan (0.40), United States (0.18), Singapore (0.10), Korea (0.08), 
Germany (0.07), Australia (0.05), Netherlands (0.04), United Kingdom (0.03), France (0.03), Malaysia 
(0.02), Italy : Germany (0.29), France (0.21), United States (0.10), United Kingdom (0.10), Switzerland 
(0.06), Netherlands (0.06), Spain (0.06), Belgium-Luxembourg (0.06)Austria (0.03), Japan (0.03), Japan : 
United States (0.42), Korea (0.09), Germany (0.08), Singapore (0.05), United Kingdom (0.05), Australia 
(0.05), Indonesia (0.05), Thailand (0.04), Malaysia (0.04), Canada (0.04), France (0.03), Netherlands (0.02), 
Philippines (0.02), Italy (0.02), Korea : United States (0.37), Japan (0.33), Germany (0.07), Singapore 
(0.04), Indonesia (0.04), Canada (0.03), United Kingdom (0.03), Malaysia (0.03), France (0.02), Italy 
(0.02), Thailand (0.02), Malaysia: Japan (0.27), United States (0.25), Singapore (0.24), Germany (0.05), 
United Kingdom (0.05), Australia (0.05), Korea (0.04), Thailand (0.03), France (0.02), Mexico: United 
States (0.86), Japan (0.05), Germany (0.03), France (0.02), Canada (0.02), Spain (0.02), Philippines: United 
States (0.40), Japan (0.30), Germany (0.07), Singapore (0.07), Korea (0.06), United Kingdom (0.04), 
Netherlands (0.03), Australia (0.03), the United States: Canada (0.31), Japan (0.24), Mexico (0.11), 
Germany (0.08), United Kingdom (0.07), Korea (0.05), France (0.05), Singapore (0.03), Italy (0.03), 
Netherlands (0.03), and the United Kingdom: Germany (0.24), United States (0.21), France (0.17), 
Netherlands (0.13), Italy (0.09), Belgium-Luxembourg (0.09), Japan (0.07).  
27  This gives 141 observations for all G7 and Korea, and 108 observations for Germany, and 98 
observations for Mexico, Malaysia, and Philippines and 66 observations for Indonesia. 
28 For Malaysia, we use the export and import data for 1981:Q1-2006:Q2 from the DOT. The data for 
current account GDP ratio in G7 and Mexico are seasonally adjusted from IFS. But for Korea, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Philippines, this is constructed to be seasonally adjusted by regressing it on a set of quarterly 
dummy variables.  
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 here 
 
To examine the stationarity of each variable, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, 
Phillips-Perron test (PP, 1988), Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin test (KPSS, 1992) are 
used. If the data has near unit roots, then there is a possibility that the ADF tests will not reject the 
null suggesting nonstationary. To prevent this bias, the PP and KPSS tests are also conducted.29 
As we do not have evidence of a time trend of the real exchange rate and current account from 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2, only a constant is included in the ADF test.30 For the ADF test, the following 
equation is estimated:  
tit
p
i
itt yyay εβγ +∆++=∆ +−
=
− ∑ 1
2
10  
where 1−−=∆ ttt yyy  is the first difference of each variable, 0a  is the constant term, iβ  
represents the coefficients of the lagged terms of ty∆ , and tε  is the white noise residual. 
Following Schwert (1989), the maximum lag length for each country is set at 12(N/100)0.25, where 
N is the total number of observations. To determine the optimal lag length (p), the AIC is used for 
each variable. The coefficient of interest isγ . We test the null hypothesis that γ  ≥  0 against the 
alternative hypothesis that γ < 0. The rejection of the null hypothesis supports the stationary of 
the series.  
The results of unit roots tests are shown in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. The null which suggests a 
unit root for RER cannot be rejected at any significance level except for the cases of the U.S. and 
Korea and only in the ADF test. The results of the KPSS tests also suggest rejecting the stationary 
null hypothesis for most countries. When using the first differenced data series, the null 
hypothesis for the unit root can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level in all cases.31 These 
results imply that the RER is likely to be nonstationary. 
Evidence is mixed for the stationarity of CAR. The null hypothesis which suggests the 
presence of unit roots in the ADF tests cannot be rejected for most countries, with the exceptions 
of Japan and Korea. The results from the PP test are more supportive of the stationarity 
hypothesis. The unit root null hypothesis is rejected for 6 countries: Italy, the UK, Korea, 
Indonesia, Mexico, and the Philippines. The results from the KPSS test result in the stationarity 
                                                 
29 If the residuals are heterogeneous or weakly dependent, the PP test can be used as an alternative test 
(Enders, 2003). The null hypothesis of the KPSS test is that the true data has a stationary movement. 
30 For Germany, the CAR drops down from above 0.06 to -0.01 in 1991:Q1 around the time of unification. 
This structural break is captured by dummy variable. 
31 The results are upon requests.  
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hypothesis being rejected for 8 countries Canada, France, Italy, the UK, the US, Korea, Malaysia, 
and Mexico. These results suggest that the evidence is neither consistent nor strong in its 
determination of stationarity of CAR. In stark contrast, the KAR can be considered as stationary 
as reported in Table 3.4. 
Given the ambiguity regarding the stationarity of CAR, we proceed with the two different 
VAR models: in Model 1, only RER is first differenced, and in Model 2, both RER and CAR are 
first differenced.  
 
Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 here 
 
3.3.2.2 Cointegration Tests 
To see the long-run relationship between CAR and RER we perform cointegration tests, 
using the Engle-Granger method. We first consider CI1 in which we test cointegration between 
the two variables. In CI2, we expand the cointegration test by adding the KAR as the external 
factor. The lag length is set at four. (The results are little affected by small variations in the lag 
length.) Table 3.5 reports the results. They indicate that there is little evidence of cointegration 
between CAR and RER except for the case of Korea and Mexico. However, once the capital 
account is included, the evidence of cointegration in these countries gets weaker. Based on these 
results, we proceed with the assumption that CAR and RER are not cointegrated.  
 
Table 3.5 here 
 
 
3.3.2.3 Granger Causality Tests 
To see how the two economic variables are related to each other, we also perform the 
Granger-causality test between CAR and RER. We start with a bivariate model and followed by 
the same test with KAR added as an exogenous variable. The equations for causality tests are 
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where V represents the error term; m, the lag length, is set at four. The null hypothesis of Granger 
causality from the RER to the CAR is 01 =iβ .And the null hypothesis of Granger causality from 
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the CAR to the RER is 02 =iγ . The rejection of the null implies that the past values of the 
variable of interest can help predict the dependent variable. Table 3.6 shows the results.  
 
Table 3.6 here 
Lagged real exchange rates can help to predict the behavior of the current account in the UK, 
Korea, Indonesia, and Mexico. This implies that the change in the real exchange rate Granger-
causes the current account in these countries. On the other hand, the current account Granger-
causes the movement of the real exchange rate significantly only for Japan. When the capital 
account is added to the regression, the results are similar to those of the bilateral tests except for 
Indonesia where the causal relationship from the current account to the real exchange rate no 
longer exists. There is also stronger causal evidence from the real exchange rate to the current 
account for the US.  
 
3.4 Empirical Test Results  
3.4.1 Impulse Response Functions  
The empirical results that we report in the previous section suggest that the current account 
(as ratio to GDP) may be either stationary or nonstationary although, the real exchange is most 
likely to be nonstationary. We thus estimate two sets of the VAR models based on two different 
assumptions about the stationarity of the current account. Model 1 (Model 2) is the VAR model 
with stationary (nonstationary) hypothesis of the current account. In both models, the real 
exchange rate is assumed to be nonstationary. We first estimate the two models without adding 
the capital account. 
  
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 here 
 
The panels of Figure 3.3 display the point estimates of the impulse responses (the solid lines) 
bounded by one-standard-deviation bands (the dotted lines), roughly corresponding to 84 percent 
confidence intervals.32 A permanent shock leads to significant changes in the real exchange rate 
and the current account in most countries. With the exception of the Philippines, the correlation 
between the two variables is positive in most countries. In other words, the real exchange rate 
appreciates (depreciates) while the current account improves (deteriorates). The significant 
appreciation, of the real exchange rate after a permanent shock, occurs through several channels. 
                                                 
32 Standard errors for the impulse responses and forecast error variance decompositions are computed using 
Monte Carlo simulations with 1000 iterations.  
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The first, it can be explained by consumption behavior. The (anticipated) productivity gains or a 
technology shock can trigger both capital inflows and an increase in consumption and investment. 
Higher capital inflows due to the productivity shock lead to an increase in the demand for 
domestic currency and its appreciation. Also, the higher demand for domestic goods due to 
wealth effect leads to currency appreciation (Alquist and Chinn, 2002; Bussiere, 2005; Lee and 
Chinn, 2006). This channel also leads to a reduction in the current account.  
Second, the Balassa−Samuelson hypothesis theory as follows: If the productivity shock in the 
tradable goods sector leads to a higher relative price of nontradable goods, and if purchasing 
power parity holds for tradable goods, then the real exchange rate appreciates (Choudhri and 
Khan, 2004). Since both the supply of and the demand for tradable goods increase, the change in 
the current account is ambiguous.  
Third, Blanchard et al., (2005) and Chinn and Lee (2009) explain the permanent shock as a 
preference shock which can have long-run effects on the real exchange rate. According to Chinn 
and Lee (2009), the positive home good preference shock brings an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate while improving the current account.  
In the case of a temporary shock, the responses of the real exchange rate and current account 
are negatively correlated. In other words, the real exchange rate depreciates (in most countries 
with exception of the U.K. and the Philippines) while the current account improves (in all 
countries). This is consistent with the Mundell-Fleming analysis in which a temporary shock such 
as expansionary monetary policy leads to an incipient decline in the domestic interest rate, 
leading to a capital outflow and exchange rate depreciation. And this depreciation increases the 
current account and has an expansionary effect on income.  
In Figure 3.4, we examine the impulse responses for Model 2. Under a permanent shock, the 
correlation of the real exchange rate and the current account responses is now insignificant in the 
majority of cases. Compared to Figure 3.3 (Model 1), there are more cases of negative correlation, 
often significant, as in the cases of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Mexico.  
One notable difference from Model 1 is the persistent responses of the current account after a 
temporary shock. This is not surprising since in this model, the current account is assumed to be 
nonstationary. What is surprising is that a temporary shock generates significant and permanent 
changes in the current account while responses in the real exchange rate are negligible. These 
results are inconsistent with the prevailing presumption that volatility in the (real and nominal) 
exchange rates is due to monetary or financial shocks that have temporary effects on the real 
exchange rate. While models exist that show that a temporary shock can have a permanent effect 
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on the real exchange rate and the economy, the combination we observe in Figure 3.4 is difficult 
to reconcile with those models. These results suggest that Model 1 should be preferred to Model 2.  
In Figure 3.5, we augment Model 1 by adding the capital account as an external factor.33 
Compared with Figure 3.3, the correlation becomes insignificant under a permanent shock once 
the capital account is included for Canada, Germany, Korea, and Malaysia. There are significant 
differences in the movement of the real exchange rate and the current account in the U.S. after 
adding the capital account. Also, for France, the response of the exchange rate to a temporary 
shock becomes stronger and the negative correlation, in the first several quarters, becomes more 
significant. Other than these, impulse responses to either a permanent or temporary shock remain 
similar to those of Model 1. 
 
 
3.4.2 Forecast Error Decomposition 
Table 3.7 presents variance decompositions of the current account and the real exchange rate. 
They show the fraction of the forecast error variance for each variable that is attributable to the 
permanent and temporary shocks. Model 1 is employed based on the results reported in the 
previous section. We present the forecast variance decomposition for four and twelve quarter 
horizons.  
 
Table 3.7 here 
 
The predominant source of variation in the real exchange rate is the permanent shock in most 
countries with the exception of Korea and Indonesia. For France, Italy, Japan, and the U.K., the 
contribution of the permanent shock exceeds 95 percent, and it also increases over time. The 
current account, on the other hand, is almost exclusively driven by temporary shocks in all 
countries. We have tried other variations. The results are similar except for a few cases. 
The results suggest that the real exchange rate and the current account are probably 
determined by different sources. In particular, the current account is strongly influenced by 
factors that have temporary effects on the real exchange rate. 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
                                                 
33 We also conduct the impulse response graph with nonstationary current account with capital account. 
The results are pretty the same with model 2.  
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This paper investigates the dynamic relationship between the current account and the real 
exchange rate in response to permanent and temporary shocks using structural VAR models for 
seven developed countries and five developing countries. Special focus is given to the issue of the 
stationarity of the current account. Capital flows are also added to capture external shocks as well 
as potential structural breaks due to financial liberalization.  
We find that the results for unit root tests for the current account are ambiguous. By testing 
two different VAR models, each taking an opposing stance on the stationarity of the current 
account, we conclude that the responses based on the assumption of a stationary current account 
are a better fit to the current theoretical view than those based on a nonstationary current account 
process. The stationarity of the current account has a fundamental policy implication. It suggests 
that imbalances on the current account are a short-term phenomenon that will dissipate in the long 
run. Since a stationary current account balance is consistent with the sustainability of external 
debts, government intervention to stabilize the current account balance is unwarranted unless the 
imbalance is excessive (Lau and Baharumshah, 2005). 
A permanent shock induces a positive correlation – that is, increasing the current account 
while appreciating the real exchange rate. On the other hand, under a temporary shock, the 
correlation of the two variables is negative – that is, an increase in the current account is 
associated with a real depreciation.  
The results on the variance decomposition suggest that the real exchange rate and the current 
account are probably determined by different sources. In particular, the current account is 
strongly influenced by factors that have temporary effects on the real exchange rate. On the other 
hand, factors that drive the real (nominal) exchange rate have little to do with the current account.  
These results have important policy implications. Among others, it is important to understand 
that the current account is mainly driven by temporary shocks such as monetary shocks or 
disturbances that are behind short-run business cycles. Excessive emphasis on maintaining 
balance of the current account might be counterproductive. Another implication is that trying to 
find the equilibrium real exchange rate in connection with the current account, especially defining 
it as the level at which the current account is in balance (or consistent with long-term capital 
inflows) is likely to be futile. The real exchange rate is an endogenous variable, which is not 
closely related to the temporary factors that affect the current account in the short run.  
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Figure 3.1  The Real Exchange Rate 
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Figure 3.2  The Current Account-GDP Ratio 
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Figure 3.3  The Impulse Responses of Model 1 
Canada 
Permanent Shock Temporary Shock 
0 5 10 15
-0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
 
Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15
0.000000
0.000001
0.000002
0.000003
0.000004
0.000005
0.000006
0.000007
 
Current Account 
0 5 10 15
-0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
 
Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15
0.000000
0.000001
0.000002
0.000003
0.000004
0.000005
0.000006
0.000007
 
Current Account 
 
France 
Permanent Shock Temporary Shock 
0 5 10 15
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
 
Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
 
Current Account 
0 5 10 15
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
 
Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
 
Current Account 
    
Germany 
Permanent Shock Temporary Shock 
0 5 10 15
-0.016
-0.008
0.000
0.008
0.016
0.024
0.032
0.040
0.048
 
Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15
-0.0016
0.0000
0.0016
0.0032
0.0048
0.0064
0.0080
0.0096
 
Current Account 
0 5 10 15
-0.016
-0.008
0.000
0.008
0.016
0.024
0.032
0.040
0.048
 
Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15
-0.0016
0.0000
0.0016
0.0032
0.0048
0.0064
0.0080
0.0096
 
Current Account 
 
Italy  
Permanent Shock Temporary Shock 
0 5 10 15
-0.012
-0.006
0.000
0.006
0.012
0.018
0.024
0.030
0.036
 
Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15
-0.0025
0.0000
0.0025
0.0050
0.0075
0.0100
0.0125
 
Current Account 
0 5 10 15
-0.012
-0.006
0.000
0.006
0.012
0.018
0.024
0.030
0.036
 
Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15
-0.0025
0.0000
0.0025
0.0050
0.0075
0.0100
0.0125
 
Current Account 
 
Japan 
Permanent Shock Temporary Shock 
0 5 10 15
-0.032
-0.016
0.000
0.016
0.032
0.048
0.064
0.080
0.096
 
Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15
-0.0008
0.0000
0.0008
0.0016
0.0024
0.0032
0.0040
0.0048
0.0056
 
Current Account 
0 5 10 15
-0.032
-0.016
0.000
0.016
0.032
0.048
0.064
0.080
0.096
 
Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15
-0.0008
0.0000
0.0008
0.0016
0.0024
0.0032
0.0040
0.0048
0.0056
 
Current Account 
 
U.K. 
Permanent Shock Temporary Shock 
0 5 10 15
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
 
Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15
-0.0025
0.0000
0.0025
0.0050
0.0075
0.0100
 
Current Account 
0 5 10 15
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
 
Exchange Rate 
0 5 10 15
-0.0025
0.0000
0.0025
0.0050
0.0075
0.0100
 
Current Account 
 
35 
 
Figure 3.3  The Impulse Responses of Model 1 continued 
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Figure 3.4  The Impulse Responses of Model 2 
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Figure 3.4  The Impulse Responses of Model 2 continued 
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Figure 3.5  The Impulse Responses of Model 3 
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Figure 3.5  The Impulse Responses of Model 3 continued 
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Table 3.1  Optimal Lag Length 
 LR AIC AICC 
Canada 6 1 1 
Japan 4 5 2 
The U.S 7 3 3 
The U.K. 1 1 1 
Germany 7 7 1 
Italy 6 1 1 
France 7 7 7 
Korea 3 3 3 
Mexico 5 5 5 
Indonesia 4 4 1 
Malaysia 1 3 1 
The Philippines 5 8 1 
41 
 
Table 3.2 Unit Root Tests for the Real Exchange Rate 
 
 
Note:  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test: Reported are the µτ  test statistics The number in the 
parenthesis is the lag length used in each test . The Akaike Information Criteria is used for 
selection of the lag length. Critical values are 1%= -3.48, 5%= -2.88, and 10%= -2.58.  
 
Phillips-Perron (PP) Test: Four lags are used in the tests. Critical values are 1%= -3.48, 5%= -
2.88, and 10%= -2.58.  
 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) Test: Four lags are used in the tests. Critical 
values are 1% = 0.739, 5%=0.46, and 10% = 0.32. 
 
For all tests, we apply the same critical values since the sample sizes are close. ** (***) indicates 
significance at the 5 (1) percent level. 
Country ADF PP KPSS 
Canada -2.02 (6) -1.48 1.97*** 
France -2.35 (0) -2.34 2.02*** 
Germany -2.12 (6) -2.68 0.58** 
Italy -2.49 (0) -2.52 0.19 
Japan -2.25 (0) -2.27 2.28*** 
United Kingdom -1.69 (0) -1.90 1.12*** 
  United States -3.00** (4) -2.47 0.28 
Korea -3.11** (1) -3.46 1.28*** 
Indonesia -1.43 (0) -1.47 2.65*** 
Malaysia  -0.76 (0) -0.82 2.86*** 
Mexico -2.35 (8) -3.08 0.35 
Philippines -0.81 (6) -1.71 2.12*** 
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Table 3.3 Unit Root Test for the Current Account-GDP Ratio 
 
Note: See note for Table 3.1 for details. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Unit Root Test for the Capital Account-GDP Ratio 
 
Note: See note for Table 3.1 for details 
 
 
 
 
Country ADF PP KPSS 
Canada -2.34 (0) -2.37 0.72** 
France -2.11 (4) -2.39 0.68** 
Germany -2.34 (0) -2.37 0.19 
Italy -2.86 (0) -2.93** 0.86*** 
Japan -3.03 (2)** -2.61 0.38 
United Kingdom -2.61 (0) -2.62** 0.65** 
  United States -0.84 (1) -0.72 1.69*** 
Korea -3.27** (1) -3.40** 0.79** 
Indonesia -2.29 (4) -3.36** 0.26 
Malaysia  -1.51 (3) -1.23 1.22*** 
Mexico -2.49 (8) -3.69*** 1.03*** 
Philippines -2.03 (3) -3.41** 0.21 
Country ADF PP KPSS 
Canada -1.25 (7) -7.81*** 1.49*** 
France -2.43 (3) -10.04*** 0.53  
Germany -2.15 (9) -8.92*** 0.30 
Italy -3.06 (9)** -9.91*** 0.26 
Japan -2.82 (2)* -6.26** 0.27 
United Kingdom -3.39 (3)*** -11.01** 0.63** 
United States -1.31 (3) -9.92** 1.68*** 
Korea -7.81 (0)*** -7.87** 0.09 
Indonesia -4.20 (0)*** -4.29** 0.51** 
Malaysia  -2.27 (13) -5.07** 0.15 
Mexico -1.95 (3) -6.47** -1.43 
Philippines -2.44 (3) -7.70** 0.28 
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Table 3.5 Cointegration Tests 
 
 CI1 CI2 
 (CAR, RER) (CAR, RER, KAR) 
Canada 
-2.66 
1%        5%        10% 
-3.98     -3.38     -3.08 
-3.05 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.40     -3.80     -3.50 
France 
-2.14  
1%        5%        10% 
-3.98     -3.38     -3.08 
-2.95  
1%        5%        10% 
-4.41     -3.81     -3.50 
Germany 
-2.76 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.00     -3.39     -3.08 
-2.69 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.43     -3.82     -3.51 
Italy 
-2.63 
1%        5%        10% 
-3.98     -3.38     -3.08 
-2.75  
1%        5%        10% 
-4.40     -3.80     -3.50 
Japan 
-2.65 
1%        5%        10% 
-3.98     -3.38     -3.08 
-1.98 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.41     -3.81     -3.50 
The United Kingdom 
-1.82 
1%        5%        10% 
-3.98     -3.38     -3.08 
-1.86 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.40     -3.80     -3.50 
The United States 
-3.11* 
1%        5%        10% 
-3.98     -3.38     -3.08 
-2.68 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.41     -3.81     -3.50 
Korea 
-3.92** 
1%        5%        10% 
-3.98     -3.38     -3.08 
-2.94 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.42     -3.82     -3.51 
Indonesia 
-2.84 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.08     -3.44     -3.11 
  -3.26 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.53     -3.88     -3.55 
Malaysia 
-1.54 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.01     -3.40     -3.09 
-2.12 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.90     -4.08     -3.70 
Mexico 
-4.22*** 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.01     -3.40     -3.09 
-4.17** 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.44     -3.83     -3.52 
Philippines 
-2.69 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.01     -3.40     -3.09 
-2.53 
1%        5%        10% 
-4.44     -3.83     -3.52 
Note:  
The Engle-Granger Cointegration test is used for cointegration analysis. The critical values are 
for cointegrating relation with a constant term. ** (***) indicates significance at the 5 (1) percent 
level. 
The critical values are obtained from MacKinnon (1991).  
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Table 3.6 Granger Causality test on CAR and RER  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent 
variables  
Lagged variables  (Bilateral) Lagged variables  
(Multivariate) 
 RER CAR RER CAR 
Canada RER  0.15 (0.96)  0.12 (0.97) 
 CAR 2.37 (0.06)*  2.22 (0.07)*  
France RER  0.83 (0.51)  1.30 (0.27) 
 CAR 1.50 (0.20)  1.06 (0.38)  
Germany RER  0.29 (0.88)  0.39 (0.82) 
 CAR 2.28 (0.07)*  2.19 (0.08)*  
Italy  RER  0.56 (0.69)  0.49 (0.75) 
 CAR 0.91 (0.46)  1.30 (0.28)  
Japan RER  5.32 (0.00)***  2.64 (0.04)** 
 CAR 1.03 (0.39)  1.69 (0.16)  
U.K.  RER  0.14 (0.97)  0.32 (0.86) 
 CAR 3.66 (0.01)***  3.83 (0.01)***  
U.S.  RER  0.47 (0.76)  0.49 (0.74) 
 CAR 2.12 (0.08)*  2.60 (0.04)**  
Korea RER  1.22 (0.30)  2.16 (0.08)* 
 CAR 16.82 (0.00)***  4.46 (0.00)***  
Indonesia RER  1.33 (0.27)  0.89 (0.48) 
 CAR 7.53 (0.00)***  1.476 (0.22)  
Malaysia RER  2.27 (0.07)*  2.20 (0.13) 
 CAR 2.06 (0.09)*  0.86 (0.51)  
Mexico RER  1.34 (0.26)  0.99 (0.42) 
 CAR 5.43 (0.00)***  4.78 (0.00)***  
Philippines RER  0.84 (0.50)  1.24 (0.30) 
 CAR 0.23 (0.92)  0.40 (0.81)  
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Table 3.7 The Variance Decomposition with Model 1  
 
 Exchange Rate Current Account 
 Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary 
 4 12 4 12 4 12 4 12 
Canada 99.74 99.77 0.26 0.23 0.12 0.24 99.88 99.76 
France 95.74 98.18 4.25 1.81 14.80 7.24 85.20 92.75 
Germany 75.93 85.39 24.06 14.60 31.17 29.01 68.83 70.98 
Italy 99.58 99.84 0.41 0.15 1.15 1.20 98.84 98.79 
Japan 96.88 95.44 3.11 4.55 21.43 19.39 78.56 80.60 
U.K.  96.27 98.02 3.72 1.98 3.60 2.78 96.39 97.21 
U.S.  58.65 70.04 41.34 29.95 31.58 27.17 68.42 72.82 
Korea 40.34 66.62 59.65 33.37 19.36 15.17 80.64 84.83 
Indonesia 34.08 49.39 65.91 50.60 25.04 21.01 74.95 78.98 
Malaysia 55.60 61.82 44.39 38.17 26.63 19.55 73.36 80.44 
Mexico 80.74 85.34 19.25 14.65 30.39 20.16 69.60 79.83 
Philippines 87.58 92.95 12.41 7.04 10.34 14.20 89.66 85.79 
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Chapter Four 
 Purchasing Power Parity and Half Life: Another Look 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Purchasing power parity (PPP) is one of the most important building blocks in modeling an 
open economy. It has been studied in a voluminous literature. An emerging consensus after 
decades of extensive research is that the real exchange rate is stationary but its mean reversion 
takes an implausibly long time. Studies by Frankel (1986), Abuaf and Jorion (1990), Diebold, 
Husted, and Rush (1991), Cheung and Lai (1994), and Lothian and Taylor (1996) all reach a 
similar conclusion. Their estimates of the half-life of the PPP deviations fall between 3 and 5 
years.34  Rogoff (1996) calls the lengthy half-lives in the presence of a high degree of exchange 
rate volatility “the PPP puzzle.” This is puzzling because real shocks cannot account for the 
majority of the short-run volatility of real exchange rates while nominal or monetary shocks can 
only have strong effects over a time frame during which wages and prices are sticky. The half-
lives of monetary shocks under nominal rigidity would be predicted 1 to 2 years (Rogoff, 1996). 
 More recent research examines various aspects of the half-life measurement including 
uncertainty about point estimates (Rossi, 2005), the bias associated with inappropriate 
aggregation across heterogeneous coefficients (Taylor, 2001), time aggregation of commodity 
prices (Imbs et al., 2005), and downward bias in estimates of dynamic lag coefficients (Choi et al., 
2006). Chortareas and Kapetanios (2005) propose an alternative measure which focuses on the 
cumulative effects of the shocks. Some are able to find that half-lives are shorter than the 
“consensus” while others merely confirm the consensus or show that the half-life is even longer. 
It would be fair to say that the puzzle largely remains unresolved.35  
In this paper, we investigate the PPP puzzle and the long-run mean reverting behavior of the 
real exchange rate in its six alternative definitions. We consider the trade-weighted effective real 
exchange rate as well as the bilateral rate vis-à-vis the US dollar while using both the CPI and the 
WPI as price indices. We compare the conventional univariate tests and the panel tests. In panel 
tests, we employ both the test of Levine, Lin, and Chu (LLC, 2002) and the more recent test by 
Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS, 2003). In addition, we investigate the behavior of the relative price of 
traded goods to nontraded goods and the impact of the Balassa-Samuelson effect on the real 
exchange rate using the Penn World Table (PWT) data.  
                                                 
34 The half-life in the above studies is 4.6 years in Frankel (1986), 3.3 years in Abuaf and Jorion (1990), 6 
years for dollar-sterling and 3 years for franc-sterling in Lothian and Taylor (1996).  
35 Nonlinear models are not considered in this brief literature survey. 
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 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the six alternative definitions 
of the real exchange rate and the data used to generate them. Section 3 discusses the empirical 
methodology and estimation results. Section 4 ends with concluding remarks.  
 
4.2 The Definitions of the Real Exchange Rate 
Annual data from 1974 to 2003 are collected for 27 industrial countries and emerging market 
economies in East Asia and Latin America, yielding between 511 and 811 observations 
depending on the definition of the real exchange rate. Data for the nominal exchange rates, CPI 
and WPI for each country are obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the PPP 
data set is from the PWT.  
We consider six alternative definitions of the real exchange rate.  The first index of the real 
exchange rate, RX1, is obtained in the following way. 
*
tttt ppeq +−=    
te  is the nominal bilateral exchange rate against the US dollar (an increase thus means a 
depreciation of the domestic currency), tp  is the domestic CPI and
*
tp  is the US CPI.36 All 
variables are in logarithm.   
The second index, RX2, is the trade-weighted real effective exchange rate. It is obtained as 
the trade-weighted average of the bilateral real exchange rates as defined in RX1. The weights are 
calculated for five major trading partners during the period from 1985 to 1987, based on the total 
volume of trade, the data for which are from the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT). The third 
and the fourth indices of the real exchange rate (RX3, RX4) are defined in a way similar to the 
first and the second, with the CPI replaced by the WPI. When the WPIs of trade partners are not 
available, we use the CPIs instead. 
RX5 is defined as the relative price of tradables to non-tradables in the country. It is defined 
as,  
N
t
T
tt
N
t
T
tt ppeppq −+=−= *  
where the *Ttp  stands for the international prices of tradables and 
N
tp  is the domestic prices of 
nontradables.  Following the tradition, we employ the CPI of the domestic country and the WPI 
of the base country as the proxy for the price of nontradables and the foreign price of tradables, 
respectively. (Edwards, S., 1989; Chowdhury, 2004)  
                                                 
36As the domestic CPI is not available for Bangladesh, Brazil, and Germany, the GDP deflator is used. 
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The sixth index of the real exchange rate, RX6, is constructed by the PPP ratio obtained from 
the PWT and the bilateral dollar exchange rate. The PPP ratio is defined as “the number of 
currency units required to buy goods equivalent to what can be bought with one unit of the base 
country. That is, the national currency value of GDP divided by the real value of GDP in 
international dollars”.37 It is thus similar to the ratio of the domestic and the foreign price indices. 
The main difference is that, unlike the CPIs or the WPIs that use each country’s own weighting 
systems, both indices are calculated using the same weighting scheme. Thus, using them helps 
reduce an important source of the index number problem that is inherent in the PPP study. RX6 is 
obtained by dividing the PPP ratio by the actual nominal exchange rate.  
  
4.3 Empirical Results 
4.3.1 The Unit-Roots Tests   
We first perform unit-root tests using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF). The lag 
length for the ADF test is selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The results of 
these univariate unit-root tests are in Table 4.1.  They indicate that we cannot reject the null of 
nonstationarity with the RX1 index for any country at the 5 percent significance level. With the 
other definitions, only a small number of cases support that the real exchange rate is stationary. 
With the ADF test, we are able to find some more cases that support PPP. Nevertheless, the 
evidence does not seem to be overwhelming enough to reject the nonstationarity of the real 
exchange rate and accept PPP. These results are consistent with what has been reported in 
numerous studies including Messe and Rogoff (1988), Lothian and Taylor (1994), and Taylor 
(2002). 
Table 4.1 here 
 Frankel (1986), Froot and Rogoff (1995), and Lothian and Taylor (1996) attribute the failure 
of PPP to the low power of the test. One approach to improve the power of PPP testing is to use a 
longer data span as in Frankel (1986), Abuaf and Jorion (1990), Kim (1990), Lothian and Taylor 
(1996), Frankel and Rose (1996), and Taylor (2002). Another approach is to use panel data as in, 
Oh (1996), Wu (1996), and Lothian (1997). Oh (1996) and Wu (1996) employ the test developed 
by LLC (2002). It may be viewed as a pooled ADF test in which all the first-order autoregressive 
coefficients of the unit-root tests are assumed to be equal and have a standard normal distribution. 
The more recent test developed by IPS (2003) relaxes the strong restriction of the equality of the 
first-order autogressive coefficients as in the LLC test and pools separate cross-section 
                                                 
37 An international dollar has the same purchasing power over total US GDP as the US dollar in a given 
base year (PWT data appendix in Summers and Heston, 1991). 
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estimates.38  The t statistic of the IPS test is the simple mean of the t-statistics from univariate 
regressions for individual countries.39 We apply both the LLC and the IPS panel unit-roots tests. 
We estimate two models: one without lags, AR(1), and one with optimal lag selected by the AIC, 
AR(p).40  
Table 4.2 here 
 Table 4.3 here 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 provide the empirical results of the two panel unit-root tests. Table 4.2 
shows that the t-statistic from the LLC test provides no support for PPP at the 5 percent 
significant level whether we employ the AR(1) or AR(p) assumption. Also all estimated first-
order auto regressive coefficients are greater than 0.7 and close to 1, implying near-
nonstationarity of the real exchange rate. In a remarkable contrast, Table 4.3 presents strong 
evidence for the stationarity of the real exchange rate in all six definitions. First of all, under the 
assumption of the AR(1) model, we can reject the null at the 5 percent significance level with the 
t  statistic in all cases. With an optimal lag length for each country, we can reject the null of 
nonstationarity for all real exchange rate indices using either statistic at the 5 percent significant 
level. This suggests that the power and the efficiency of the test clearly matters when testing for 
PPP. These IPS test results are consistent with results in Wu and Wu (2001).  
Another interesting finding is that the null hypothesis is more strongly rejected with the WPI-
based real exchange rates (RX3 and RX4) than with the CPI-based ones (RX1 and RX2). This 
finding is in line with our expectation and previous findings such as those of Kim (1990), Froot 
and Rogoff (1995), and Wu (1996). Somewhat surprisingly, there is a weaker support for PPP 
with the trade-weighted real exchange rates than with the bilateral ones whether the real exchange 
rate is defined with the CPI or the WPI.41  
 
4.3.2 The Half-life of Deviations from PPP  
The autoregressive representation of the real exchange rate can be used to compute the half-
life − the time period for a shock to decay to half of its initial size. Table 4.4 presents the 
                                                 
38 Both tests also assume that countries are cross section independent.  
39 See Fleissig and Strauss (2001). In other words, Ntt N
i i
/)(
1∑ == , where )(/ iii Vart γγ=   and iγ is the 
first-order autoregressive coefficient of each country i. The 
tZ statistic, σµ /)( −= tNZt , of the IPS test 
is distributed as standard normal where µ=)( itE , 2)( σ=itVar . 
40 We use Matlab for the IPS tests with the maximum lag length for the AR(p) model restricted to six.  
41 The reason for this finding is not immediately clear. It might be that countries target their real exchange 
rate against the US dollar and try to keep it stable for international competitiveness or other reasons.  
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estimates of half-life for individual countries obtained with the AR(p) model. 42   Following 
Cecchetti et al., (2002) and Murray and Papell (2002), we report the mean and median of half-life 
estimates.43 The presence of outliers and negative estimates in the case of RX2 and RX5 suggests 
that the mean is a less reliable guide than the median as a summary statistic.  
Table 4.4 here  
The results indicate, first of all, in all cases except RX6, the median of the estimated half-life 
is shorter than 3 years. In the case with RX3, it is less than 2 years. Even with RX6, which has the 
longest median, it is less than 4 years. Second, the half-life for RX3 is shorter than that for RX1 
in the majority of cases. The median is also considerably shorter for RX3 than for RX1. It is 
consistent with the conventional results that show that PPP holds better with the WPI than with 
the CPI. Third, the traded-weighted real exchange rates (RX2 and RX4) show longer half-lives 
and slower convergence than the bilateral rates in most sample countries regardless of the 
definition of the real exchange rate. For instance, the half-life is longer (shorter) with RX2 than 
with RX1 in 18 (9) cases. The half-life is longer (shorter) with RX4 than with RX3 in 14 (4) cases. 
Fourth, the half-life for RX6 appears somewhat longer than for RX1 or RX3. The table that 
the half-life is longer (shorter) with RX6 than with RX1 in 19 (8) cases and with RX3 in 15 (3) 
cases. To the extent that RX6 eliminates some biases due to index number problems arising from 
using the price indices reported by individual countries, this result seems to suggest that biases 
and index number problems may not be a major reason for the failure of PPP as reported in 
previous studies. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this paper we have re-examined the PPP hypothesis with various definitions of the real 
exchange rate for the post-Bretton Woods period of floating exchange rates. Some of important 
findings of this paper can be summarized as follows: 1) PPP holds better and the half-life of the 
real exchange rate is shorter when the WPI rather than the CPI is used as the price index; 2) 
Somewhat surprisingly, there is no evidence that PPP holds better with trade-weighted real 
exchange rates than with bilateral ones regardless of the price index used; 3) In general, we are 
unable to reject the unit-root null in univariate tests. Strong evidence for PPP emerges only with 
                                                 
42 In the case of the simple AR(1) process, the half-life can be obtained as ln(1/ 2) / ln( 1)γ + , which is the 
solution to T in the equation 5.0)1( =+ Tγ  where γ is the estimated first-order autoregressive 
coefficient. For higher autoregressive models, the measurement of half-life is more complicated. Rossi 
(2005) suggests that the half-life be calculated by ln(1/ 2) (1) / ln( 1)b γ +  where (1)b is the sum of the 
estimated AR coefficients. 
43 For the IPS test, Cecchetti et al., (2002) average half-life across individual countries.  
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the use of IPS panel tests. In marked contrast, the LLC panel tests provide no evidence on PPP, 
perhaps due to its homogeneity restriction on the parameter; 4) We find the median of half-live 
estimates to be less than 3 years, which shorter than the current consensus; 5) Finally, the half-life 
with estimated the IPS method is shorter than 3 years in all cases except RX6. This is shorter than 
3-5 years as surveyed in Rogoff (1996) although, in most cases, still longer than the 1-2 years 
estimates from models incorporating sticky prices. 
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Table 4.1 Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Roots Test  
Countries RX1 RX2 RX3 RX4 RX5 RX6 
Argentina -2.22 (2) -2.36 (1) - - - -1.78 (1) 
Algeria -0.38 (0) -0.35 (0) - - - -0.59 (0) 
Australia -2.57 (1)  -2.01 (0) -3.06** (1) -2.33 (0) -2.79 (1) -1.76 (0) 
Bangladesh 3.74**(8) -2.71 (0) - - - -1.07 (8) 
Brazil -2.03 (0) -1.95 (0) -1.80 (0) -1.80 (0) -1.95 (0) -3.27** (2) 
Canada -2.23 (1) -1.78 (0)   -3.09** (1) -3.15** (1) -1.72 (1) -1.74 (3) 
Chile -2.69* (8) -1.99 (7) -2.43 (8) -1.67 (7) -4.14*** (5) -2.74 (7) 
Colombia -2.39 (3) -0.78 (2) -1.92 (3) -0.30 (4) -3.73*** (5) -1.80 (3) 
Denmark -3.03** (1) -0.80 (7) -2.64* (1) -2.28 (2) -2.13 (1) -2.64 (1) 
Egypt -0.69 (6) -1.31 (1) -2.04 (1) -0.65 (0) -2.74* (5) -0.70 (6) 
Finland -2.86* (1) -2.24 (1) -2.78* (1) -1.04 (0) -2.56 (1) -2.80 (1) 
France -3.20** (1) -2.71* (1) - - - -2.91* (1) 
Germany -3.50** (4) -3.02** (5) - - - -2.67* (1) 
Greece -2.83* (1) -1.25 (0) -0.90 (8) -3.67** (8) -0.84 (2) -1.43 (0) 
Hungary -0.25 (0) 1.62 (7) -1.21 (0) -1.00 (0) 0.24 (0) -1.11 (1) 
India -1.80 (4) -1.75 (0) -1.05 (1) -1.39 (0) -2.11 (0) -0.99 (4) 
Indonesia -1.71 (3) -2.14 (7) -1.06 (2) -1.63 (7) -2.00 (3) -1.47 (0) 
Ireland -2.90* (1) -2.00 (0) -2.95* (1) -0.96 (1) -1.29 (0) -1.49 (0) 
Italy -3.15** (1) -2.62 (2) - - - -1.68 (0) 
Korea -2.88* (1) -2.67 (0) -2.54 (0) -0.78 (2) -3.32** (2) -2.64 (2) 
Mexico -0.44 (8) -0.46 (8) -0.99 (8) -0.98 (8) -0.12 (8) -2.56 (1) 
Netherland
s -4.03*** (4) -2.11 (8) -2.93* (1) -2.96** (8) -2.64* (1) -2.86* (1) 
New 
Zealand -3.50** (1) -2.44 (5) -2.93 (1) -3.52** (1) -2.29 (1) -4.65*** (1) 
Norway -3.01** (2) -3.42** (2) -2.34 (0) -3.09** (8) -1.50 (0) -2.74* (1) 
Portugal -2.25 (1) -0.65 (0) - - - -1.67 (1) 
Sweden -3.38 (4) -1.96 (0) -3.48** (4) -2.76* (1) -2.76* (1) -3.13** (2) 
Thailand -1.73 (0) -1.12 (1) -2.63* (0) -1.68 (1) -3.44*** (0) -1.05 (0) 
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Table 4.2  Estimation Results with the LLC (2002) Test  
 
 With AR(1) Assumption With AR(p) Assumption 
t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient 
RX1 3.67 0.8431 0.71 0.8136 
RX2 1.30 0.9145 1.13 0.9153 
RX3 3.25 0.7897 2.21 0.7685 
RX4 1.77 0.9294 1.50 0.9273 
RX5 4.42 0.8288 2.08 0.7936 
RX6 1.23 0.8531 -1.59* 0.8384 
 
* Note: The critical values are -2.32 (1 percent), -1.64 (5 percent), and -1.28 (10 percent). The 
maximum lag is set to six for the AR(p) model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 Estimation Results with the IPS (2003) Panel Unit-Roots Test  
 
 With AR(1) Assumption With AR(p) Assumption 
t statistic tZ statistic t statistic tZ statistic 
RX1 -1.82*** -1.72** -2.15*** -3.63*** 
RX2 -1.86*** -1.93** -1.81***      -1.68** 
RX3 -2.10*** -2.86*** -2.40*** -4.26*** 
RX4 -1.89*** -1.78** -1.98***      -2.21** 
RX5      -1.74** -1.10 -2.09*** -2.84*** 
RX6      -1.78** -1.49* -2.11*** -3.40*** 
 
 
* Note: This test is for 27 countries for RX1, RX2 and RX6, 20 countries for RX5 and 19 for 
RX3, RX4. The critical values for t-test are -1.80 (1 percent), -1.73 (5 percent), and -1.69 (10 
percent). The critical values for z-test are -2.33 (1 percent), -1.64 (5 percent), and -1.28 (10 
percent). The maximum lag is set to six for the AR(p) model. 
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Table 4.4  Half-life with the IPS Estimation with the AR(p) Model 
 
Country RX1 RX2 RX3 RX4 RX5 RX6 
Algeria  32.66 31.74 - - - 15.33 
Argentina 1.18 1.06 - - - 0.88 
Australia  2.48 3.36 1.62 1.94 1.48 3.86 
Bangladesh 5.91 1.54 - - - 10.04 
Brazil  2.48 2.74 2.61 2.68 2.51 4.92 
Canada  4.13 4.02 1.70 1.54 4.55 3.79 
Chile 3.32 2.84 - 1.58 2.08 3.39 
Colombia  5.28 84.18 6.57 121.26 3.11 9.60 
Denmark 1.68 1.56 2.12 1.56 3.18 2.26 
Egypt  4.44 9.74 3.41 12.12 1.79 3.71 
Finland  1.86 3.11 2.14 7.97 2.84 2.00 
France  1.57 1.73 - - - 1.77 
Germany  1.93 2.42 - - - 2.12 
Greece 2.16 4.48 1.69 1.36 5.22 4.49 
Hungary  24.59 -2.10 8.25 8.81 -40.18 8.02 
India  9.05 10.03 7.92 11.56 4.31 14.15 
Indonesia  8.33 8.56 2.34 3.30 4.85 4.61 
Ireland  1.87 2.20 1.76 3.32 4.71 3.60 
Italy  1.39 2.32 - - - 3.36 
Korea 1.09 1.22 1.32 1.94 0.95 2.66 
Mexico 1.29 1.27 2.55 2.57 1.95 2.35 
Netherlands 1.53 1.97 1.54 7.14 1.95 1.65 
New Zealand 1.03 5.08 1.26 0.81 2.35 1.40 
Norway 2.30 1.27 - - 3.61 1.94 
Portugal  3.10 7.01 - - - 5.95 
Sweden  2.94 2.97 1.23 2.42 1.93 1.94 
Thailand 2.91 4.27 1.36 1.94 0.72 7.01 
       
Mean 4.91 7.43 2.85 10.31 0.70 4.70 
Median 2.48 2.84 1.94 2.57 2.43 3.60 
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